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Abstract
The article investigates an evidence-based semantics for epistemic log-
ics in which pieces of evidence are interpreted as equivalence relations
on the epistemic worlds. It is shown that the properties of knowledge ob-
tained from potentially infinitely many pieces of evidence are described by
modal logic S5. At the same time, the properties of knowledge obtained
from only a finite number of pieces of evidence are described by modal
logic S4. The main technical result is a sound and complete bi-modal
logical system that describes properties of these two modalities and their
interplay.
1 Introduction
The question of which modal logic is better at capturing the epistemic properties
has long been a subject for philosophical discussions. While some think that
such properties could be described by modal logic S4 [1, 5], others argued in
support of logic S5 that extends S4 by adding Negative Introspection axiom [3].
There have also been suggestions to consider some of the modal systems in
between S4 and S5 [6],[7, p.82].
In this article we propose a uniform framework in which S4 and S5 modalities
can be interpreted as referring to two different types of knowledge. Our approach
is based on the assumption that an agent’s perception about the current epis-
temic state is formed by a (possibly infinite) number of pieces of evidence also
commonly referred to as facts, tests, observations, or justifications. The main
contribution of this article is the observation that the knowledge formed by a fi-
nite number of pieces of evidence has modal properties described by modal logic
S4, whereas the knowledge formed by a potentially infinite number of pieces of
evidence has modal properties described by modal logic S5.
We refer to the knowledge formed by a finite number of pieces of evidence
as attainable knowledge and to the knowledge that formed by a potentially
infinite number of pieces of evidence simply as knowledge. The main technical
result of this article is a sound and complete logical system with two modalities
that capture individual properties of the two types of knowledge as well as the
properties that connect these two types of knowledge.
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1.1 Grand Hotel Example
Consider the famous Hilbert Grand Hotel that has infinitely many rooms. By
a single observation in this setting we mean opening and examining a room in
order to establish whether it is empty. If the hotel has vacancies, then at least
one room is empty. By opening just a single door from that specific room one can
learn that the hotel has vacancies. We write  (“hotel has vacancies”) to express
this fact. The modality   denotes attainable knowledge that can be formed from
finitely many observations, in this case just a single observation. On the other
hand, if the hotel has no vacancies, then the knowledge about this can not be
obtained from examining finitely many rooms: ¬  (“hotel has no vacancies”).
At the same time, one can learn that hotel is full by examining all rooms in the
hotel. We write this as 2(“hotel has no vacancies”), where modality 2 denotes
the knowledge that can be formed from (potentially infinite) set of all available
pieces of evidence.
Let us first show that attainable knowledge does not satisfy axiom S5, also
known as Negative Introspection axiom:
¬  ϕ→  ¬  ϕ. (1)
Indeed, consider again the epistemic world w in which Hilbert Grant Hotel is
full and let ϕ be statement “the hotel has vacancies”. Thus, w 1 ϕ. Since
by examining hotel rooms one cannot conclude anything false, it follows that
w 1  ϕ. Hence, w  ¬ ϕ. At the same time, informally, the only reason why
w  ¬ ϕ is true is that the hotel is full. Since the latter can not be established
through finitely many observations, w  ¬   ¬   ϕ. More formally, to prove
w  ¬   ¬   ϕ we need to show that no matter which finite set of evidence is
examined, there still will be an epistemic world u indistinguishable from w such
that u   ϕ. Indeed, suppose that we have chosen to examine rooms r1, . . . , rn.
Let r be any room different from rooms r1, . . . , rn. Let u be an epistemic world
in which all room except for room r are occupied. Thus, epistemic worlds w
and u are indistinguishable through the chosen finite set of examinations. Yet
u   ϕ because in epistemic world u, it is enough to examine a single room r
to learn that the hotel has vacancies. This concludes the counterexample for
Negative Introspection principle (1).
Let us now consider a weaker form of Negative Introspection axiom used in
logic S4.4 [6]:
ϕ→ (¬  ϕ→  ¬  ϕ). (2)
The above counterexample for formula (1) does not work as a counterexample
for formula (2) because in that setting w 1 ϕ. Nevertheless, principle (2) is
not valid in general. Indeed, let us modify the hotel setting by assuming that
some rooms in the hotel might have bedbugs. The presence of the bedbugs can
be tested when a room is examined. Furthermore, let us assume that once a
single room in the hotel becomes infected with bedbugs all guests immediately
leave the hotel. Thus, the hotel might have either (a) visitors and bedbugs, or
(b) no visitors and no bedbugs, or (c) bedbugs and no visitors. Consider an
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epistemic world w in which the hotel has no visitors and no bugs. Let ϕ be the
statement “hotel has no visitors”. Thus, w  ϕ. Note that there are two ways
to verify that hotel has no visitors: either by examining all rooms to observe
that they are all vacant or by examining a single room that contains bedbugs.
Since in the epistemic world w the hotel is not infected with bugs, the only way
to verify that the hotel is empty in this world is to examine all rooms. Thus,
w  ¬ ϕ. To finish the counterexample for formula (2), it suffices to show that
w 1  ¬   ϕ. In other words, we need to prove that after opening a finite set
of rooms r1, . . . , rn we will not be able to distinguish epistemic state w from an
epistemic state u such that u   ϕ. Indeed, let r be any room different from
rooms r1, . . . , rn and let u be the epistemic world in which room r is infected
with bedbugs. Note that u   ϕ because in epistemic state u it is enough to
examine the bug-infected room r to conclude that the hotel is empty.
1.2 Formal Semantics of Evidence
To make our Grand Hotel example more formal, we need to introduce the formal
semantics of evidence-based knowledge. Since the purpose of the pieces of evi-
dence is to distinguish epistemic worlds, the pieces of evidence can be viewed as
equivalence relations on the worlds. When an agent takes into account several
pieces of evidence, equivalence relations corresponding to these pieces intersect
to form the equivalence relation of the agent. In the second Grant Hotel ex-
ample above, each room is in one of the three states: occupied, vacant without
bedbugs, and vacant with bedbugs. An epistemic world can be described by
specifying the state of each room. The observation that consists of examining
room r can distinguish two epistemic worlds in which room r is in different
states. It can not distinguish two epistemic worlds in which room r is in the
same state.
In other words, we assemble agent’s knowledge from several pieces of evi-
dence in exactly the same way as how distributed knowledge [3] of a group is
assembled from the individual observations of the members of the group. Thus,
the logical system developed in this article could also be used to describe two
different forms of group knowledge by an infinite group of agents: modality 2
represents the standard distributed knowledge by the whole group and modality
  represents the distributed knowledge by a finite subgroup of the whole group.
The formal evidence semantics described above is similar to the one for the
budget-constrained knowledge proposed by Naumov and Tao [8]. It is different
from the neighbourhood semantics of evidence investigated by van Benthem and
Pacuit [11], and the probabilistic approach of Halpern and Pucella [4].
1.3 Logical System
In this article we propose a sound and complete logical system that describes
universal properties of knowledge modality 2 and attainable knowledge modal-
ity  . The axioms involving only modality 2 are exactly those forming modal
logic S5:
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1. Truth: 2ϕ→ ϕ,
2. Positive Introspection: 2ϕ→ 22ϕ,
3. Negative Introspection: ¬2ϕ→ 2¬2ϕ,
4. Distributivity: 2(ϕ→ ψ)→ (2ϕ→ 2ψ).
Later we do not list Positive Introspection principle among axioms of our system
because, just like in the case of logic S5, Positive Introspection is derivable from
the other axioms. We prove this in Lemma 1. The axioms involving only
modality   are exactly those forming modal logic S4:
1. Attainable Truth:  ϕ→ ϕ,
2. Attainable Positive Introspection:  ϕ→    ϕ,
3. Attainable Distributivity:  (ϕ→ ψ)→ ( ϕ→  ψ).
Finally, there appears to be two independent principles that capture the inter-
play of the two modalities:
1. Monotonicity:  ϕ→ 2ϕ,
2. Mixed Negative Introspection: ¬  ϕ→ 2¬  ϕ.
The first of these principles states that any knowledge that can be formed from
a finite subset of observations can also be formed on the bases of the whole set
of observations. The second principle is significantly more interesting. We have
seen in our first Grant Hotel example that Negative Introspection is not true
for attainable knowledge. Namely an agent in a fully occupied hotel can not
learn that statement  (“the hotel has vacancies”) is false by examining only
finitely many rooms. It can learn this, however, by examining all room in the
hotel and this is exactly what Mixed Negative Introspection principle claims.
Surprisingly, Mixed Negative Introspection principle is provable from the other
axioms of our logical system. We show this in Lemma 2. As a result, Mixed
Negative Introspection is not included as an axiom of our system. Additionally,
it is easy to see that Attainable Truth principle follows from Truth axiom and
Monotonicity axiom. For this reason, we do not list Attainable Truth as one of
our axioms either. Finally, although one can state two forms of Necessitation
inference rule: one for 2 modality and another for  , the former follows from
the latter and Monotonicity axiom. Thus, our system, in addition to Modus
Ponens, only includes Attainable Necessitation inference rule.
1.4 Outline
This article is organized as following. In Section 2 we define the syntax and the
semantics of our logical system. In Section 3 we list the axioms and the inference
rules of this system. In Section 4 we present two examples of formal proofs in our
system, including a proof of Mixed Negative Introspection principle mentioned
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above. In Section 5 we prove the soundness of our logical system with respect
to our evidence-based semantics. In Section 6 we establish the completeness of
our system. Section 7 concludes.
2 Syntax and Semantics
In this section we describe the formal syntax and the formal evidence-based
semantics of our logical system. Throughout the rest of the article we assume
a fixed infinite set of propositional variables.
Definition 1 The set Φ of all formulae ϕ is defined by the Backus-Naur form
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ |   ϕ | 2ϕ, where p represents propositional variables.
Definition 2 A Kripke model with evidence is 〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉, where
1. W is a set of “epistemic worlds”,
2. E is an arbitrary “evidence” set,
3. ∼e is an “indistinguishability” equivalence relation on W for each e ∈ E,
4. pi is a function that maps propositional variables into subsets of W .
For instance, in our first Grand Hotel example, an epistemic world is a function
N→ {vacant, occupied} that assigns a state to each room in the hotel. The set
of evidence is N, where evidence with number r ∈ N corresponds to examining
room with number r in this hotel. Epistemic worlds w1 and w2 are ∼r-equivalent
if room number r has the same state in both of the worlds. In other words, w1 ∼r
w2 if w1(r) = w2(r). Finally a function pi may, for example, map propositional
variable p into the set of all epistemic worlds representing a nonempty hotel:
pi(p) = {w ∈W | ∃r ∈ N such that w(r) = occupied}.
In this article, we write w1 ∼F w2 if w1 ∼e w2 for each e ∈ F .
Definition 3 For any formula ϕ ∈ Φ and any epistemic world w ∈ W of a
Kripke model 〈W,E, {∼e}, pi〉, let the satisfiability relation w  ϕ be defined as
follows,
1. w  p if w ∈ pi(p),
2. w  ¬ϕ if w 1 ϕ,
3. w  ϕ→ ψ if w 1 ϕ or w  ψ,
4. w   ϕ if there is a finite F ⊆ E such that w ∼F u implies u  ϕ for
each u ∈W ,
5. w  2ϕ if u  ϕ for each u ∈W such that w ∼E u.
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3 Axioms
In addition to propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system con-
sists of the following axioms:
1. Truth: 2ϕ→ ϕ,
2. Negative Introspection: ¬2ϕ→ 2¬2ϕ,
3. Distributivity: 2(ϕ→ ψ)→ (2ϕ→ 2ψ),
4. Monotonicity:  ϕ→ 2ϕ,
5. Attainable Positive Introspection:  ϕ→    ϕ,
6. Attainable Distributivity:  (ϕ→ ψ)→ ( ϕ→  ψ).
We say that formula ϕ is a theorem in our logical system and write ` ϕ if
formula ϕ is derivable from the axioms of our systems using Modus Ponens and
Attainable Necessitation inference rules:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
ϕ
 ϕ.
We write X ` ϕ if formula ϕ is derivable from the theorems of our logical
systems and an additional set of axioms X using only Modus Ponens inference
rule.
4 Examples
The soundness of our logical system is shown in Section 5. In this section we
give two examples of formal proofs in our system. The first example, which
will be used later in the proof of the completeness, is the standard observation
that Positive Introspection principle is derivable from the axioms of modal logic
S5. Since our system does not contain Necessitation rule for modality 2, the
proof is using Attainable Necessitation inference rule and Monotonicity axiom
instead.
Lemma 1 ` 2ϕ→ 22ϕ.
Proof. Note that formula ¬2ϕ→ 2¬2ϕ is an instance of Negative Introspection
axiom. Thus, ` ¬2¬2ϕ→ 2ϕ by the law of contrapositive in the propositional
logic. Hence, `  (¬2¬2ϕ → 2ϕ) by Attainable Necessitation inference rule.
Thus, ` 2(¬2¬2ϕ→ 2ϕ) by Monotonicity axiom and Modus Ponens inference
rule. Thus, by Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` 2¬2¬2ϕ→ 22ϕ. (3)
At the same time, 2¬2ϕ → ¬2ϕ is an instance of Truth axiom. Thus,
` 2ϕ → ¬2¬2ϕ by contraposition. Hence, taking into account the following
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instance of Negative Introspection axiom ¬2¬2ϕ → 2¬2¬2ϕ, one can con-
clude that ` 2ϕ→ 2¬2¬2ϕ. The latter, together with statement (3), implies
the statement of the lemma by the laws of propositional reasoning. 
Our next and perhaps more interesting example is the proof of Mixed Neg-
ative Introspection principle mentioned in Section 1.3 of the introduction.
Lemma 2 ` ¬  ϕ→ 2¬  ϕ.
Proof. By Truth axiom, ` 2   ϕ →  ϕ. Thus, by the law of contrapositive
in the propositional logic, ` ¬   ϕ → ¬2   ϕ. At the same time, by Negative
Introspection axiom, ` ¬2 ϕ→ 2¬2 ϕ. Hence, by the laws of propositional
reasoning,
` ¬  ϕ→ 2¬2  ϕ. (4)
Note that `  ϕ →     ϕ by Attainable Positive Introspection axiom and
`     ϕ → 2   ϕ by Monotonicity axiom. Thus, by the laws of propositional
reasoning, `  ϕ → 2   ϕ. Hence, by the law of contrapositive in the proposi-
tional logic, ` ¬2   ϕ → ¬   ϕ. Then, `  (¬2   ϕ → ¬   ϕ) by Attainable
Necessitation inference rule. At the same time,
`  (¬2  ϕ→ ¬  ϕ)→ 2(¬2  ϕ→ ¬  ϕ)
by Monotonicity axiom. Thus, ` 2(¬2 ϕ→ ¬ ϕ) by Modus Ponens inference
rule. Hence, ` 2¬2 ϕ→ 2¬ ϕ by Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens
inference rule. Therefore, ` ¬   ϕ → 2¬   ϕ, by the laws of propositional
reasoning taking statement (4) into account. 
5 Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system with respect to the
evidence-based semantics introduced in Section 2.
Theorem 1 If ` ϕ, then w  ϕ for each epistemic world w ∈W of each Kripke
model 〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉.
The soundness of propositional tautologies and Modus Ponens inference rule is
straightforward. Below we prove the soundness of each of the remaining axioms
and Attainable Necessitation inference rule as separate lemmas.
Lemma 3 If w   ϕ, then w     ϕ.
Proof. By Definition 3, the assumption w   ϕ implies that there is a finite
F ⊆ E such that u  ϕ for each u ∈W where w ∼F u.
Again by Definition 3, it suffices to show that v   ϕ for all v ∈W such that
w ∼F v. To establish this, it is enough to prove that u  ϕ for all u ∈ W such
that v ∼F u. Note that w ∼F v ∼F u. Thus, w ∼F u because ∼f is an equiva-
lence relation for each element f ∈ F . Therefore, u  ϕ by the choice of set F . 
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Lemma 4 If w   (ϕ→ ψ) and w   ϕ, then w   ψ.
Proof. By Definition 3, the assumption w   (ϕ → ψ) implies that there is
a finite F1 ⊆ E such that u  ϕ → ψ for each u ∈ W such that w ∼F1 u.
Similarly, the assumption w   ϕ implies that there is a finite F2 ⊆ E such
that u  ϕ for each u ∈W such that w ∼F2 u.
Let F = F1 ∪ F2. It suffices to show that u  ψ for each u ∈ W such that
w ∼F u. Indeed, statement w ∼F u implies that w ∼F1 u and w ∼F2 u. Hence,
u  ϕ→ ψ and u  ϕ due to the choice of sets F1 and F2. Therefore, u  ψ by
Definition 3. 
Lemma 5 If w  2ϕ, then w  ϕ.
Proof. By Definition 3, assumption w  2ϕ implies that u  ϕ for all u ∈ W
such that w ∼E u. Note that w ∼e w for all e ∈ E because ∼e is an equivalence
relation. Hence, w ∼E w. Therefore, w  ϕ. 
Lemma 6 If w  ¬2ϕ, then w  2¬2ϕ.
Proof. By Definition 3, assumption w  ¬2ϕ implies that there is u ∈ W such
that w ∼E u and u 1 ϕ.
Consider any v ∈W such that w ∼E v. By Definition 3, to prove w  2¬2ϕ,
it suffices to show that v  ¬2ϕ. Note that w ∼E u and w ∼E v. Thus, v ∼E u
due to ∼e being an equivalence relation for each e ∈ E. Recall that u 1 ϕ.
Hence, v 1 2ϕ by Definition 3. Therefore, v  ¬2ϕ again by Definition 3. 
Lemma 7 If w  2(ϕ→ ψ) and w  2ϕ, then w  2ψ.
Proof. Consider any u ∈ W such that w ∼E u. By Definition 3, it suffices to
show that u  ψ. Indeed, by Definition 3 assumptions w  2(ϕ → ψ) and
w  2ϕ imply that u  ϕ → ψ and u  ϕ. Therefore, u  ψ, again by Defini-
tion 3. 
Lemma 8 If w   ϕ, then w  2ϕ.
Proof. Consider any u ∈ W such that w ∼E u. By Definition 3, it suffices to
prove that u  ϕ. By the same definition, the assumption w   ϕ implies that
there is finite F ⊆ E such that v  ϕ for each v ∈ W such that w ∼F v. Note
that statement w ∼E u implies that w ∼F u. Therefore, u  ϕ. 
Lemma 9 If w  ϕ for each epistemic world w ∈ W of each Kripke model
〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉, then w   ϕ for each epistemic world w ∈ W of each
Kripke model 〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉.
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Proof. Consider any epistemic world w ∈ W of an arbitrary Kripke model
〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉. By Definition 3, it suffices to show that there is F ⊆ E
such that u  ϕ for each u ∈ W where w ∼F u. Indeed, let F = ∅. Note that
u  ϕ for each u ∈W due to the assumption of the lemma. 
This concludes the proof of the soundness of our logical system.
6 Completeness
In this section we prove the completeness of our logical system. Throughout the
section we use two operations on sequences. If w is a sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
and u is a sequence (y1, y2 . . . , ym), then by concatenation w :: u of these two
sequences we mean sequence (x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2 . . . , ym). By head hd(w) of
a nonempty sequence w = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) we mean element xn. For example,
(a, b) :: (c) = (a, b, c) and hd(a, b, c) = c.
Theorem 2 For any formula ϕ0 ∈ Φ, if w  ϕ0 for each epistemic world
w ∈W of each Kripke model 〈W,E, {∼e}e∈E , pi〉, then ` ϕ0.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that
0 ϕ0. We first define a “canonical” Kripke model 〈W∞,W∞, {∼e}e∈W∞ , pi〉 and
later show that w 1 ϕ0 for some w ∈ W∞. Note that the set of epistemic
worlds in the canonical model is identical to the evidence set. One can think
that all pieces of evidence related in some sense to a given epistemic world
are combined together into a single evidence associated with this world. The
evidence associated with world w is simply referred to as evidence w.
We define set W∞ of epistemic worlds using the “unravelling” technique [10].
Informally, this set consists of sequences of the form (X0, 1, X1, . . . , n, Xn),
where X0, . . . , Xn are maximal consistent sets of formulae and each of 1, . . . , n
is either a finite subset of W∞ or symbol ∗. In what follows, the case when  is
a finite subset of W∞ will form a  -accessibility relation and the case  = ∗ will
form both  -accessibility and 2-accessibility relations. Such sequences can be
visualised, see Figure 1, as paths in an infinite collection of infinite trees whose
vertices are maximal consistent sets of formulae and whose edges are labeled
with the ’s described above.
X1
X2 X4 X6
X3 X5
X7
X8 X9
!2
!1 !3
!4
!5 !6 !7
Figure 1: Trees of sequences.
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Formally, set W∞ is specified as the union of a recursively defined infinite
sequence of sets W0,W1,W2, . . . . These sets represent different stages of build-
ing the infinite set of infinite tree partially depicted in Figure 1. Note, however,
that stages do not correspond to the levels of the trees. Generally speaking,
vertices at the same level are not created at the same stage.
Definition 4 A sequence of sets W0,W1, . . . is defined recursively as follows
1. W0 is the set of all single-element sequences (X), where X is a maximal
consistent subset of Φ,
2. Wn+1 contains all sequences of the form w :: (, Y ) such that
(a) w ∈ ⋃i≤nWi,
(b)  is either symbol ∗ or a finite subset of ⋃i≤nWi,
(c) Y is a maximal consistent subset of Φ,
(d) if  = ∗, then {ϕ | 2ϕ ∈ hd(w)} ⊆ Y ,
(e) if  ⊆ ⋃i≤nWi, then {ϕ |   ϕ ∈ hd(w)} ⊆ Y .
Definition 5 W∞ =
⋃
iWi.
Lemma 10 Set W∞ is infinite.
Proof. Recall that 0 ϕ0 by the choice of statement ϕ0. Thus, set {¬ϕ0} is
consistent. Since our language contains infinitely many propositional variables,
set {¬ϕ} could be extended to a maximal consistent set in an infinitely many
ways. Hence, set W0 is infinite by Definition 4. Therefore, set W∞ is infinite
by Definition 5. 
Informally, two sequences are ∼e-equivalent if they start with the same prefix
and once they deviate all subsequent ’s either are equal to ∗ or contain element
e, see Figure 2 (a). The formal definition is below.
Definition 6 For any epistemic world w = (X0, 1, X1, . . . , n, Xn), any epis-
temic world u = (X ′0, 
′
1, X
′
1, . . . , 
′
m, X
′
m), and any e ∈W∞, let w ∼e u if there
is k such that
1. 0 ≤ k ≤ min{n,m},
2. Xi = X
′
i for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
3. i = 
′
i for all i such that 0 < i ≤ k,
4. for all i, if k < i ≤ n, then either e ∈ i or i = ∗,
5. for all i, if k < i ≤ m, then either e ∈ ′i or ′i = ∗.
Definition 7 pi(p) = {w ∈W∞ | p ∈ hd(w)}.
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Xk
Xk+1!k+1 !k+1
Xn-1
Xk-1
X1
Xn
... ...
X0
...
!1
!k
Xk+1'
Xm-1'
Xm'
'
!n !m'
(a)
Xk
Xk+1!k+1
Xk-1
X1
Xk+n
X0
...
!1
!k
!k+n
...
(b)
☐'.
☐'.
☐'.
☐'.
Xk
Xk+1 *
Xk-1
X1
Xk+n
X0
...
"1
"k
*
...
(c)
☐&
☐&
☐&
☐&
Figure 2: Illustrations: (a) for Definition 6, where i and 
′
i either are equal to
∗ or contain e for each i ≥ k, (b) for Lemma 11, and (c) for Lemma 12 and
Lemma 13.
The canonical Kripke model 〈W∞,W∞, {∼e}e∈W∞ , pi〉 is now fully defined. Next
we establish several properties of this model that are necessary for our proof of
the completeness.
First we show that if set hd(w) contains a formula  ϕ, then so does set
hd(u) for each descendant u of vertex w.
Lemma 11 For any k ≥ 0, any n ≥ 0, and any
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk, k+1, Xk+1, . . . , k+n, Xk+n) ∈W∞,
if  ϕ ∈ Xk, then  ϕ ∈ Xk+n.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on n, see Figure 2 (b). If n = 0, then
assumption  ϕ ∈ Xk implies that  ϕ ∈ Xk+n. If n > 0, then  ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1
by the induction hypothesis. Hence, Xk+n−1 `     ϕ by Attainable Positive
Introspection axiom.
Case I: k+n = ∗. Note that Xk+n−1 `     ϕ implies Xk+n−1 ` 2   ϕ by
Monotonicity axiom. Hence, 2   ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1 due to the maximality of set
Xk+n−1. Then,  ϕ ∈ Xk+n by Definition 4 and due to the assumption k+n = ∗.
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Case II: k+n 6= ∗. Statement Xk+n−1 `     ϕ implies that     ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1
due to the maximality of set Xk+n−1. Thus,  ϕ ∈ Xk+n by Definition 4. 
We next show that if hd(w) contains a formula 2ϕ, then so does hd(u) for
each descendant u of vertex w reachable through edges all of which are labeled
by symbol ∗.
Lemma 12 For any k ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, and any
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk, k+1, Xk+1, . . . , k+n, Xk+n) ∈W∞,
if 2ϕ ∈ Xk and i = ∗ for all i such that k < i ≤ k + n, then 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on n, see Figure 2 (c). If n = 0, then
assumption 2ϕ ∈ Xk implies that 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n. If n > 0, then 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1
by the induction hypothesis. Hence, Xk+n−1 ` 22ϕ by Lemma 1. Thus,2ϕ ∈ Xk+n by Definition 4 and due to the assumption k+n = ∗. 
The next lemma is a converse of Lemma 12. It shows that if hd(u) contains
a formula 2ϕ where u is a descendant of vertex w reachable through edges all
of which are labeled by symbol ∗, then so does hd(w).
Lemma 13 For any k ≥ 0, any n ≥ 0, and any
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk, k+1, Xk+1, . . . , k+n, Xk+n) ∈W∞,
if 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n and i = ∗ for all i such that k < i ≤ k + n, then 2ϕ ∈ Xk.
Proof. We prove the statement of the lemma by induction on n, see again
Figure 2 (c). If n = 0, then assumption 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n implies that 2ϕ ∈ Xk. We
assume now that n > 0.
Case I: 2ϕ /∈ Xk+n−1. Thus, ¬2ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1 due to the maximality of the
set Xk+n−1. Hence, Xk+n−1 ` 2¬2ϕ by Negative Introspection axiom. Then,2¬2ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1 due to the maximality of the setXk+n−1. Hence, ¬2ϕ ∈ Xk+n
by Definition 4 and because k+n = ∗. Thus, 2ϕ /∈ Xk+n due to the consistency
of the set Xk+n, which is a contradiction with the assumption of the lemma.
Case II: 2ϕ ∈ Xk+n−1. Thus, 2ϕ ∈ Xk by the induction hypothesis. 
The next two lemmas are relatively standard lemmas for a completeness
proof of a modal logic. Their proofs show how a sequence representing an
epistemic world can be extended to produce different types of child nodes on
the trees in Figure 1.
Lemma 14 For any w ∈ W∞, any ¬   ϕ ∈ hd(w), and any finite F ⊆ W∞,
there is u ∈W∞ such that w ∼F u and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(u).
Proof. We first show that the following set is consistent:
Y0 = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ |   ψ ∈ hd(w)}.
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Assume the opposite. Thus, there must exist  ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ hd(w) such
that ψ1, . . . , ψn ` ϕ. Hence, by the deduction theorem for propositional logic,
` ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . ).
Then, by Attainable Necessitation inference rule,
`  (ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By Attainable Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
`  ψ1 →  (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By Modus Ponens inference rule,
 ψ1 `  (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By repeating the last two steps n− 1 times,
 ψ1, . . . , ψn `  ϕ.
Hence, hd(w) `  ϕ by the choice of formulae ψ1, . . . , ψn. Thus, ¬  ϕ /∈ hd(w)
due to the consistency of the set hd(w), which contradicts the assumption of
the lemma. Therefore, set Y0 is consistent.
Let Y be any maximal consistent extension of set Y0 and let u be the sequence
w :: (F, Y ). We next show that u ∈W∞. Indeed, since w ∈W∞, by Definition 5,
there must exist n1 ≥ 0 such that w ∈ Wn1 . At the same time, since set F is
a finite subset of W∞, by Definition 5, there must exist n2 ≥ 0 such that
F ⊆ ⋃i≤n2 Wi. Let n = max{n1, n2}. Thus, w ∈ ⋃i≤nWi and F ⊆ ⋃i≤nWi.
Hence, w :: (F, Y ) ∈ Wn+1 by Definition 4. Therefore, u = w :: (F, Y ) ∈ W∞ by
Definition 5.
Finally, w ∼F u by Definition 6. To finish the proof of the lemma, note that
¬ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(u). 
Lemma 15 For any w ∈ W∞ and any ¬2ϕ ∈ hd(w), there is u ∈ W∞ such
that w ∼W∞ u and ¬ϕ ∈ hd(u).
Proof. We first show that the following set is consistent:
Y0 = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | 2ψ ∈ hd(w)}.
Assume the opposite. Thus, there must exist formulae 2ψ1, . . . ,2ψn ∈ hd(w)
and ψ1, . . . , ψn ` ϕ. Hence, by the deduction theorem for the propositional logic,
` ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . ).
Then, by Attainable Necessitation inference rule,
`  (ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
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By Monotonicity axiom and Modus Ponens Inference rule,
` 2(ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By Distributivity axiom and Modus Ponens inference rule,
` 2ψ1 → 2(ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By Modus Ponens inference rule,
2ψ1 ` 2(ψ2 → . . . (ψn → ϕ) . . . )).
By repeating the last two steps n− 1 times,
2ψ1, . . . ,2ψn ` 2ϕ.
Hence, hd(w) ` 2ϕ by the choice of formulae ψ1, . . . , ψn. Thus, ¬2ϕ /∈ hd(w)
due to the consistency of the set hd(w), which contradicts the assumption of
the lemma. Therefore, set Y0 is consistent.
Let Y be any maximal consistent extension of set Y0 and let u be sequence
w :: (∗, Y ). We next show that u ∈W∞. Indeed, since w ∈W∞, by Definition 5,
there must exist n ≥ 0 such that w ∈ Wn. Hence, w :: (∗, Y ) ∈ Wn+1 by
Definition 4. Therefore, u = w :: (∗, Y ) ∈W∞ by Definition 5.
Finally, let us observe that w ∼e u for each e ∈ W∞ by Definition 6. Thus,
w ∼w∞ u. To finish the proof of the lemma, note that ¬ϕ ∈ Y0 ⊆ Y = hd(u). 
By Definition 4, elements of set W∞ are sequences of the form
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk),
where i is either symbol ∗ or a subset of W∞. One might wonder if elements
of W∞ are wellfounded. In other words, is it possible for an element w ∈ W∞
to be a member of one of its own i? Lemma 17 shows that such elements do
not exist. This is a very important observation for our proof of completeness.
Lemma 16 is essentially a different form of Lemma 17 which is easier to prove
by induction.
Lemma 16 For any k ≥ 0, any n ≥ 0, any t ≥ 0, and any
w = (X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk, k+1, Xk+1, . . . , k+n, Xk+n) ∈Wt,
if k 6= ∗, then k ⊆
⋃t−1
i=0Wi.
Proof. We prove this statement by induction on n. First, assume that n = 0.
Thus, w = (X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk). Hence, By Definition 4, assumptions w ∈Wt
and k 6= ∗ imply that k ⊆
⋃t−1
i=0Wi.
Suppose now that n > 0. By Definition 4, the assumption w ∈ Wt implies
that
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , k, Xk, k+1, Xk+1, . . . , k+n−1, Xk+n−1) ∈Wt−1.
Thus, by the induction hypothesis, k ⊆
⋃t−2
i=0Wi. Therefore, k ⊆
⋃t−1
i=0Wi. 
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Lemma 17 w /∈ k for each w = (X0, 1, X1, . . . , n, Xn) ∈ W∞ and each
k ≤ n.
Proof. By Definition 5, assumption w ∈ W∞ implies that there is t ≥ 0 such
that w ∈Wt. Let m be the smallest m such that w ∈Wm. Thus, w /∈
⋃m−1
i=0 Wi.
At the same time, k ⊆
⋃m−1
i=0 Wi by Lemma 16. Therefore, w /∈ k. 
The next lemma puts together the pieces of the proof that we have de-
veloped. It connects the satisfiability of a formula in an epistemic world of the
canonical Kripke model with the maximal consistent sets out of which the world
is constructed.
Lemma 18 w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ hd(w).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structural complexity of for-
mula ϕ. If formula ϕ is an atomic proposition, then the required follows from
Definition 7 and Definition 3. If formula ϕ is a negation or an implication, then
the required follows from Definition 3 and the maximality and the consistency
of the set hd(w) in the standard way.
Suppose now that formula ϕ has the form  ψ.
(⇒) If  ψ /∈ hd(w), then ¬   ψ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of the set
hd(w). To prove w 1  ψ, by Definition 3, we need to show that for any
finite set F ⊆ W∞ there is u ∈ W∞ such that w ∼F u and u 1 ψ. Indeed,
by Lemma 14, there is u ∈ W∞ such that w ∼F u and ¬ψ ∈ hd(u). Thus,
ψ /∈ hd(u) due to the consistency of the set hd(w). Therefore, u 1 ψ by the
induction hypothesis.
(⇐) Suppose that  ψ ∈ hd(w). Thus, hd(w) `     ψ by Attainable Positive
Introspection axiom. Hence, hd(w) ` 2  ψ by Monotonicity axiom. Then,
2  ψ ∈ hd(w) (5)
due to the maximality of the set hd(w).
By Definition 3, it suffices to show that u  ψ for all u ∈ W∞ such
that w ∼w u. By Definition 6, assumption w ∼w u implies that if w =
(X0, 1, X1, . . . , n, Xn) and u = (X
′
0, 
′
1, X
′
1, . . . , 
′
m, X
′
m), then there is k such
that,
1. 0 ≤ k ≤ min{n,m},
2. Xi = X
′
i for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
3. i = 
′
i for all i such that 0 < i ≤ k,
4. for all i, if k < i ≤ n, then either w ∈ i or i = ∗,
5. for all i, if k < i ≤ m, then either w ∈ ′i or ′i = ∗.
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Figure 3: Illustrations for the proof of Lemma 18.
By Lemma 17, w /∈ i for each i ≤ n. Thus, from the condition 4 above, i = ∗
for each i such k < i ≤ n, see Figure 3 (a). Hence, by Lemma 13, statement (5)
implies that 2 ψ ∈ Xk. Thus, Xk `  ψ by Truth axiom. Then,  ψ ∈ Xk due
to the maximality of set Xk. Therefore, ψ ∈ X ′m = hd(u) by Lemma 11 and
condition 5 above. Therefore, u  ψ by the induction hypothesis.
Finally, let formula ϕ have the form 2ψ.
(⇒) If 2ψ /∈ hd(w), then ¬2ψ ∈ hd(w) due to the maximality of the set hd(w).
To prove w 1 2ψ, by Definition 3, we need to show that u 1 ψ for some
u ∈W∞ such that w ∼W∞ u. Indeed, by Lemma 15, there is u ∈W∞ such that
w ∼W∞ u and ¬ψ ∈ hd(u). Thus, ψ /∈ hd(u) due to the consistency of the set
hd(u). Therefore, u 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis.
(⇐) Suppose that 2ψ ∈ hd(w). By Definition 3, it suffices to show that u  ψ
for all u ∈W∞ such that w ∼W∞ u. Indeed, let w = (X0, 1, X1, . . . , n, Xn) and
u = (X ′0, 
′
1, X
′
1, . . . , 
′
m, X
′
m). By Definition 6, assumption w ∼W∞ u implies
that for each e ∈W∞ there is integer ke such that
1. 0 ≤ ke ≤ min{n,m},
2. Xi = X
′
i for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ ke,
3. i = 
′
i for all i such that 0 < i ≤ ke,
4. for all i, if ke < i ≤ n, then either w ∈ i or i = ∗,
5. for all i, if ke < i ≤ m, then either w ∈ ′i or ′i = ∗.
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By Lemma 10, set W∞ is infinite and, thus, it is nonempty. Hence, set {ke | e ∈
W∞} is nonempty. Set {ke | e ∈ W∞} is finite because 0 ≤ ke ≤ min{n,m} for
each e ∈W∞. Let k be the maximal element of the set {ke | e ∈W∞}. Hence,
1. 0 ≤ k ≤ min{n,m},
2. Xi = X
′
i for all i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
3. i = 
′
i for all i such that 0 < i ≤ k,
4. for all i, if k < i ≤ n, then either W∞ ⊆ i or i = ∗,
5. for all i, if k < i ≤ m, then either W∞ ⊆ ′i or ′i = ∗.
By Lemma 10, set W∞ is infinite yet sets ′i and i are finite for each i by
Definition 4. Hence, W∞ * i and W∞ * ′i for each i. Thus, conditions 4
and 5 above imply that i = ∗ for all i such that k < i ≤ n and i = ∗ for
all i such that k < i ≤ n, see Figure 3 (b). Thus, by Lemma 13, assumption2ψ ∈ hd(w) = Xn implies that 2ψ ∈ Xk = X ′k. Therefore, ψ ∈ X ′m = hd(u),
by Lemma 12. 
We are now ready to finish the proof of Theorem 2. Recall that 0 ϕ0. Consider
any maximal consistent set X0 such that ϕ0 /∈ X0. Let w0 be the single-element
sequence (X0). Thus, w0 1 ϕ0 by Lemma 18. This concludes the proof of the
theorem.
7 Conclusion
In this article we have shown that knowledge obtained from infinitely many
pieces of evidence has properties captured by modal logic S5 and knowledge
obtained from finitely many pieces of evidence has properties described by modal
logic S4. The main technical result is a sound and complete propositional bi-
modal logic that captures properties of both of these types of knowledge and
their interplay.
A natural next step is to consider first-order logic with the same two modali-
ties. Note that the knowledge modality 2 satisfies Barcan Formula [2] ∀x2ϕ→2∀xϕ because this formula is derivable from S5 axioms stated in the first-order
modal language [9]. At the same time, attainable knowledge modality   does
not satisfy Barcan Formula ∀x   ϕ →  ∀xϕ. Indeed, if variable x ranges
over an infinite domain and each value of x in this domain has a distinct single
evidence ex that justifies ϕ(x), then ∀x   ϕ is true, but  ∀xϕ is not. A com-
plete axiomatization of the interplay of these two modalities in the first-order
language remains an open problem.
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